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JOSEPH F. SPANIOL. JR.
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No. 87-5259

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1986

FRANK DEAN TEAGUE,

Petitioner,

V.

MICHAEL LANE, Director, Department of Corrections, and MICHAEL O'LEARY, Warden, Stateville Correctional Center,

Respondents.

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

WHETHER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT FAIR CROSS-SECTION

REQUIREMENT EXTENDS TO THE PETIT JURY SO AS TO

BAR THE RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY USE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IS A RECURRING QUESTION ON WHICH
THIS COURT EXPRESSED NO VIEW IN BATSON BUT WHICH
REMAINS CONTROVERSIAL, RESULTING IN CONFLICTING
DECISIONS FROM BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
THUS MERITING THIS COURT'S REVIEW.

Respondents urge that this Court need not examine this issue because in both Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) and Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986) it rejected the notion that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury reflect the composition of the community. There are two defects to this argument. First, regardless of this merit of the argument, courts of appeal have reached conflicting decisions as to this contention, and the existence of these diverging opinions alone demands that this Court grant certiorari to resolve the conflict. Second, Petitioner has never demanded that the jury which decides his guilt or innocence mirror the community, only that the prosecution be barred from exercising its challenges so as to preclude the possibility of obtaining a representative jury.

This Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to guarantee the fair possibility of a representative jury, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), and Petitioner has contended only that a prosecution's racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge interferes with the possibility that the jury will reflect a fair cross section of the community. Therefore, this Court has not yet expressly rejected Petitioner's argument on its merits.

BATSON SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO ALL CONVICTIONS NOT FINAL AT THE TIME CERTIORARI WAS DENIED IN McCRAY V. NEW YORK IN ORDER TO CORRECT THE INEQUITY AND CONFUSION WHICH RESULTED WHEN THIS COURT, WHILE SIGNALING THAT SWAIN WAS NO LONGER DISPOSITIVE, INTENTIONALLY DELAYED A DECISION ON THE ISSUE RESOLVED BY BATSON.

The flaw in Respondents' argument that Allen v. Hardy, 106 S.Ct. 2878 (1986) controls the resolution of the question of the retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986) to this case is that the direct appeal in Allen v. Hardy was final at the time this Court denied certiorari in McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). Therefore this Court was not faced with the issue presented herein when it decided Allen v. Hardy. Granting certiorari in this case would allow this Court to finally conclude its rethinking of the law of retroactivity, a desire expressed by the two members of the Court in separate opinions in Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring, and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

THE DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISIONS OF
THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS
AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REGARDING WHETHER AN EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION
MAY BE PROVEN PURSUANT TO SWAIN V. ALABAMA
OTHER THAN BY PROOF OF A SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION

OF BLACK JURORS BY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN CASE AFTER CASE, A QUESTION LEFT OPEN BY SWAIN, SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THIS COURT.

Respondents assert Petitioner has made no claim cognizable pursuant to Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) because he has not alleged the prosecution "engaged in the systematic exclusion of blacks from petit juries in case after case." (Response, p. 6) Respondents mistakenly assume a Swain violation may be established only by a showing of invariable exclusion of black jurors in more than one case, an assumption for which it offers no support of authority. The Swain opinion contains no such limitation, as the author of that opinion recognized, Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1725 n. (White, J., concurring), and the Ninth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have so held. Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1983); Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1987). The fact that the Swain argument was not raised in the state court does not bar relief for Petitioner since Respondents do not deny that the state courts denied Petitioner relief on the ground that Swain controlled, thus rejecting the claim on its merits. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).

Respectfully submitted.

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